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The aim of this article is to present results of estimating grey economy in Poland and detailed 
presentation of chosen solutions of legal-organisational and IT type introduced to Polish tax 
system in order to limit grey economy.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: The authors presented detailed analyses of empirical 
material from reports and surveys including those from the Central Statistical Office, the State 
Fiscal Administration, the Institute of Forecasting and Economic Analyses and the Ministry of 
Finance moreover they also included results of estimating grey economy by international 
experts for Europe and the world. In the article a descriptive and analytical-synthetic method 
was used. The article is a continuation of many years of research in the area of grey economy.  
Findings: An evaluation of grey economy must take into consideration advantages and 
disadvantages. Negative points are falsifying economic statistics, decreasing tax incomes to 
the state budget, faulty construction of macro-economic policy, false allocation of social funds. 
Functioning of economic entities in grey economy leads to destruction of social-economic life 
generating pathologies. An advantage of grey economy is an increasing number of working 
places, particularly for marginal workforce. People employed in this economy while not 
paying taxes directly, regulate indirect taxes, purchase goods and services taxed.   
Practical Implications: In order to more efficiently limit grey economy in Poland, it is 
necessary to constantly and systematically perform actions of a system type and not coercive. 
An important element is primary tax education and building tax mentality and morality.   
Originality/Value: The article presents a scope of actions taken and implemented by the 
government in the area of limiting grey economy in Poland in the last 5 years – economic-
legal perspective of a problem. It constituted a basis for further research.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In a literature of a case study we can find many synonyms of grey economy (in an 
alphabetic order): alternate, autonomous, black economy, black cash, clandestine, 
concealed, counter, criminal economy, dark economy, dual, grey economy, hidden 
economy, informal economy, irregular economy, invisible, irregular, marginal, 
moonshine economy, non-observed economy, occult, other, parallel economy, 
peripheral, second economy, shadow economy, submerged, subterranean, twilight, 
undeclared economy, underground economy, unexposed, unofficial economy, 
unrecorded economy, unregistered economy, unreported economy, untaxed, 
underwater. 
 
The researchers of the grey economy proposed few definitions. One of them defines 
grey economy as all economic activities that contribute to official (or observable) 
creation (increase) of GDP and are not directly registered (Schneider and Ernest, 
2000). Another definition defines as economic activities that are unintended or are not 
registered and are not in accordance with the existing law (Feige, 1979). Grey 
economy is a financial area of healthy state economy where income, from activities 
that are not prohibited by the law, are hidden in total or partially from state, fiscal and 
customs administration etc. It is an illegal turnover of legal goods and services.   
 
Due to the fact that there is no constant definition of grey economy area, the authors 
of the article point out a necessity to use many research methods in order to evaluate 
lost income from a state budget measured as Gross Domestic Product % (GDP). The 
authors are also aware of the fact that each method gives different results in estimating 
grey economy, but all the methods focus on indicating its dynamics and a direction of 
changes (Smuga, 2005). 
 
2. Estimating Grey Economy and a Scope of Illegal Activities 
 
A superior characteristic of a system of national accounts, effective in countries of the 
European Union is to ensure completeness of GDP estimation (and gross domestic 
income). That is, directly next to an observable production through statistical research 
or administrative data, taking into consideration a non-observable production, 
including grey economy and illegal activity. Grey economy entails productive 
activities in an economic meaning, totally legal (in terms of complying with the norms 
and legal regulations) but are hidden from official authorities in order to avoid (GUS, 
2015): 
− Paying income tax, value added tax (VAT) and other taxes,  
− Paying National Insurance contributions,  
− Following law restrictions such as: minimum wage rate, maximal working 
time, work safety conditions,  
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− Administrative procedures such as completing statistical questionnaires and 
other forms.  
 
Scheme 1. Grey economy - GDP 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Polish Central Statistical Office methodology estimating 
grey economy in Poland, (GUS, 2015, 2016, 2019). 
 
The core of grey economy is to hide the whole or a part of an income in order to avoid 
taxation, employ people illegally, register freelancers as unemployed. The biggest part 
of grey economy, so called hidden economy, constitutes unregistered turnovers and 
transactions of illegally existing units. In particular, it relates to decreasing incomes 
and illegal employment which means dividing remuneration into an official part and 
the one paid under-the-table and as a consequence paying lower social insurance 
contributions or not paying it at all.  
 
3. Measuring Grey Economy in Poland 
 
A size of grey economy in Poland is measured by a Polish Central Statistical Office 
on the basis of national accounts as % in generating GDP. Data that is presented by 
PCSO for 2010-2017 include calculations for a size of grey economy referring to: 
− Registered economic units with a number of workers up to 9, regardless of a 
legal form and units from a private sector without co-op with working from 
10-49 people.  
An analysis allows to state that these measurements were made for: 
o Underrated production and income in information passed to 
statistics,  
o Avoiding payment of goods and services tax (so called VAT fraud); 
− Natural person in virtue of non-registered work, in majority from services 
activities, including sexual services. 
Polish Central Statistical Office research in the area of illegal activity allowed to 
determine sectors in Poland that are exposed to grey economy the most. These are: 
− trade and vehicles repair, accommodation, and gastronomy, 
− construction, 
− real estate service, 
− industry, 
− transport and warehouse managements, 





Grey economy Illegal activity
Informal activity Hidden activity
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Scheme 2. Grey economy in Poland in 2010-2017 (in % GDP)  
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of National accounts due to a division, into institutional sectors 
and sub-sectors in 2010-2013, 2011-2014, 2014-2017, (GUS, 2015, 2016, 2019). 
 
Scheme 3. Grey economy in Poland in 2010 - 2017 (in mln PLN) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of National accounts due to a division into institutional sectors 
and sub-sectors in   2010-2013, 2011-2014, 2014-2017, (GUS, 2015, 2016, 2019). 
 
Scheme 4. Industries at risk of grey economy existence in Poland in 2007-2017 (in 
% GDP) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of National accounts due to a division into institutional sectors 
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Illegal activity entails:  
 
− production of goods and services which sale, distribution or possession is 
prohibited,  
− production activity which is usually legal but becomes illegal because it is 
performed by producers that have no right to do it e.g., medical practice 
without licence.  
 
There is not always a clear border between grey economy and illegal activity. In Polish 
national account, due to a state specificity there was a need to divide calculations for 
prostitution into a grey economy part (where the income from sexual services is 
counted) and illegal activities (pimping forbidden). Research of PCSO (since 2010) 
entail calculations in the frame of illegal activity considering: 
  
− activity of people that get financial benefit from prostitution of other people 
(pimping), 
− production and trade of drugs,  
− smuggling cigarettes. 
−  
Table 1. Illegal activity in Poland in 2010-2017  









     10061         10875         12927          13296         10323           5401            5583           5968     
in % 
GDP 
0,7 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Source: Self-study on the basis of National accounts due to a division into institutional sectors 
and sub-sectors 2010-2013, 2011-2014, 2014-2017, (GUS, 2015, 2016, 2019). 
 
Scheme 5. Illegal activity in Poland (2010-2017) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of National accounts due to a division into institutional sectors 
























Illegal activity in Poland (2010-2017)
in mln PLN % GDP
 Measurement of Grey Economy and System Ways of Limiting it – Polish Example 
 
1002 
3.1 What Implies the Existence of Grey Economy? 
 
The authors, due to analyses of written works, pay attention to the existence of many 
factors that determine existence of grey economy. According to Schneider and Medina 
these are5: 
 
− “TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION BURDENS - The distortion of 
the overall tax burden affects labor-leisure choices and may stimulate labor supply 
in the shadow economy. The bigger the difference between the total labor cost in 
the official economy and after-tax earnings (from work), the greater the incentive 
to reduce the tax wedge and work in the shadow economy. This tax wedge 
depends on social security burden/payments and the overall tax burden, making 
them a key determinant in the existence of the shadow economy,  
− QUALITY OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS- The quality of public institutions is 
another key factor in the development of the informal sector. In particular, the 
efficient and discretionary application of the tax code and government regulations 
plays a crucial role in the decision to work underground. A bureaucracy with 
highly corrupt government officials tends to be associated with greater unofficial 
activity, while good rule of law through secure property rights and contract 
enforceability increases the benefits of having a formal status. The likelihood of 
an informal sector developing thanks to the failure of political institutions in 
promoting an efficient market economy, and entrepreneurs going underground 
due to inefficient public goods provision, may be reduced if institutions can be 
strengthened and fiscal policy is more closely aligned with the median voter’s 
preferences,  
− QUALITY OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS - The quality of public institutions is 
another key factor in the development of the informal sector. In particular, the 
efficient and discretionary application of the tax code and government regulations 
plays a crucial role in the decision to work underground. A bureaucracy with 
highly corrupt government officials tends to be associated with greater unofficial 
activity, while good rule of law through secure property rights and contract 
enforceability increases the benefits of having a formal status. The likelihood of 
an informal sector developing thanks to the failure of political institutions in 
promoting an efficient market economy, and entrepreneurs going underground 
due to inefficient public goods provision, may be reduced if institutions can be 
strengthened and fiscal policy is more closely aligned with the median voter’s 
preferences. 
− REGULATIONS - Regulations such as labor market regulations or trade barriers 
for example, are another important factor that reduces freedom (of choice) for 
individuals in the official economy. They lead to a substantial increase in labor 
costs in the official economy and thus provide another incentive to work in the 
 
5Source: Medina L., Schneider F., Shadow Economies Around the World: What Did We Learn 
Over the Last 20 Years? IMF Working Paper, WP/18/17, np. 34-36. 
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shadow economy: countries that are more heavily regulated tend to have a higher 
share of the shadow economy in total GDP 
− PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICES - An increase in the shadow economy may lead to 
lower state revenues, which in turn reduce the quality and quantity of publicly 
provided goods and services. Ultimately, this may raise tax rates for firms and 
individuals, although the quality of the public goods (such as public infrastructure) 
and of the administration may continue to deteriorate. The result is an even 
stronger incentive for participating in the shadow economy. 
− TAX MORALE - The efficiency of the public sector also has an indirect effect on 
the size of the shadow economy because it affects tax morale. Tax compliance is 
driven by a psychological tax contract that entails rights and obligations on the 
part of taxpayers and citizens on the one hand, but also on the part of the state and 
its tax authorities on the other hand. Taxpayers are more inclined to pay their taxes 
honestly if they receive valuable public services in exchange. The treatment of 
taxpayers by the tax authority also plays a role. If taxpayers are treated like 
partners in a (tax) contract instead of subordinates in a hierarchical relationship, 
taxpayers will fulfil the obligations of the psychological tax contract more readily. 
Hence, (better) tax morale and (stronger) social norms may reduce the probability 
of individuals working underground. 
− DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICIAL ECONOMY - The development of the 
official economy is another key factor in the shadow economy. The higher (lower) 
the unemployment quota (GDP-growth), the higher the incentive to work in the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
− SELF-EMPLOYMENT - The higher the rate of self-employment, the more 
activities can be performed in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
− DETERRENCE - Despite the strong focus on deterrence in policies fighting the 
shadow economy and the unambiguous insights of the traditional economic theory 
of tax non-compliance, surprisingly little is known from empirical studies about 
the effects of deterrence. This is because data on the legal background and the 
frequency of audits are not available on an international basis; such data are 
difficult to collect even for OECD countries. Either the legal background is quite 
complicated, differentiating fines and punishment according to the severity of the 
offense and the true income of the non-complier, or tax authorities do not reveal 
how intensively auditing is taking place. The little empirical survey evidence 
available demonstrates that fines and punishment do not exert a negative influence 
on the shadow economy, while the subjectively perceived risk of detection does. 
However, results are often weak and Granger causality tests show that the size of 
the shadow economy can affect deterrence, instead of deterrence reducing the 
shadow economy. 
− UNEMPLOYMENT - The higher the rate of unemployment, the higher the 
probability to work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
− SIZE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR - The larger the agricultural sector, the 
more possibilities to work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus 
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− USE OF CASH - The larger the shadow economy, the more cash will be used, 
ceteris paribus. Mostly measured as M0/M1, or M1/M2, or cash per capita outside 
the banking sector. 
− SHARE OF LABOR FORCE - The higher the shadow economy, the lower the 
official labor force participation rate, ceteris paribus 
− GDP PER CAPITA (ECONOMIC GROWTH) - A larger shadow economy is 
associated with more economic activities moving out of the formal economy; 
hence, it shows a decrease in economic growth, ceteris paribus”. 
 
In case of Poland a historical factor becomes important, time of Second World War 
and communistic economy that forced Polish people to hide their incomes. A method 
that was created by Medina and Schneider6, including abovementioned factors 
allowed to estimate a size of grey economy for 158 countries in the world within 25 
years (since 1991 till 2015), taking into consideration Poland. 
 
Scheme 6. Size of grey economy in Poland and other post-communistic countries 
against the world in 1997 - 2015 (in % GDP) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Medina L., Schneider F., Shadow Economies Around the 
World: What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years? (Medina, 2017). 
 
The results of F. Schneider works concerning a size of grey economy in 28 European 
Union countries in 2004-2016, including Poland, show that in 2016 grey economy 
share in Polish GDP could even reach 23%. This means that Poland was above average 
for the EU of 5,1 points.  
 
6Note: A model MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) is a specific type of modelling 
structural equations SEM, which is widely used in psychometric and social sciences researches 
and is based on a static theory on non-observable variables created in 1970ties by Zellner 
(1970) Joreskog and Goldberger (1975). The first one to use this model to estimate grey 
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Scheme 7. Size of grey economy in Poland in chosen European Union countries in 
2004-2016 (in %GDP) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Schneider F., Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economies 
of Highly developed Countries: Selected New Results, (Schneider, 2016). 
 
Presented calculations from 2017 show that a grey economy share in Polish GDP was 
22,2 (-0,8 points) which placed Poland on 20th place among the European Union 
countries (average for the UE countries in 2017 was 17,1%). Calculations of the 
Institute for Forecasting and Economic Analyses (Instytut Prognoz i Analiz 
Gospodarczych, IPiAG) for 2018 show that a share of grey economy in Polish GDP 
decreased of 18%, that is 0,7 percentage points less than in 2017 and 1,5 p.p less than 
in 2014. IPiAG forcasted further decrease of grey economy in 2019. It was supposed 
to be due to good business cycle and tightening of tax system, in particular in terms 
of VAT tax (Fundowicz, 2019-2020). 
 
It is worth mentioning that although a grey economy share in % GDP decreases, in a 
nominal term, it increased in 2018 up to 402 billion PLN which is 6 billion PLN more 
than in 2017 and 41 billion more than in 2014.  
 
3.2 Actions Taken to Limit the Grey Economy   
 
System solutions to counteract tax frauds and to limit grey economy in Poland in the 
















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Size of grey economy in Poland in chosen European Union 





Poland 28 EU-countries/ Average (unweighted)
 Measurement of Grey Economy and System Ways of Limiting it – Polish Example 
 
1006 
Scheme 8. Size and development of grey economy in Poland in (1991-2015) - in % 
GDP 
 




Scheme 9. System solutions supporting limitation of grey economy and counteracting 




I. ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
▪ National Revenue Administration (Krajowa Administracja 
Skarbowa, KAS) 
On March 1, 2017 the National Revenue Administration was created (hereinafter: 
KAS)7. This new institution of government administration constitutes a consolidated 
and functioning administration that was before such as: tax, customs and fiscal. A 
scale and a scope of reforms performed were named as administrative ‘reform’ and its 
aim was to build a modern fiscal administration which in a wide scope uses modern 
IT solutions. A main aim of reorganization and creating KAS was to limit tax frauds, 
improve effectiveness of tax liabilities and customs levy, increase a level of freedom 
of which tax obligations to fulfill and also lower costs of fiscal administration 
functioning in relations to a level of a state budget gathering. The World Bank (Raport 
…, 2014) and International Monetary Fund (Kulicki, 2016) reports indicated the need 
 
7Note: An Act from 16 November, 2016 about National Revenue Administration (Dz. U. z 2016 
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to introduce changes, in particular consolidation of tax and fiscal administration 
services. As a pattern, while creating a conception of a reform, transformations 
performed eg. in Great Britain, Spain, Austria, Australia, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic were used (Money.pl, 2016). 
 
In an Act on KAS8 it was indicated that it constitutes ‘a specialized national 
administration that performs activities from the area of accomplishing tax income, 
customs and non-taxable state creditors, secures interests of the State Treasury and 
customs area of the European Union and also guarantees service and support for an 
entrepreneur in a proper fulfilment of customs obligations’. In a field of securing the 
State Treasury interests the most important is fighting with grey and black economy. 
The main duties of KAS in this field are: 
  
− identifying, detecting and fighting fiscal offence and fiscal frauds, 
preventing from these offences and frauds, chasing the culprit; 
− identifying, detecting and fighting offences and frauds connected with 
violating regulations in terms of goods trade of which are banned or 
limitations due to Polish law, the European Union provisions of law or 
international agreements, counteracting offences and frauds or chasing 
culprits if these were revealed by the Fiscal and Customs Service; 
− counteracting counterfeiting money and financial terrorism; 
− cooperation with proper units of other countries and international 
organizations and institutions. 
 
In order to fulfil the abovementioned tasks on a central KAS level and in its regional 
units controlling groups were created also to fight with economic crime and they are 
responsible for elimination of existing grey economy and minimisation of frauds and 
offences. An authority (after consolidation of fiscal administration) responsible for 
performing tasks connected with detecting and fighting with irregularities is a 
governor of fiscal and customs office, in particular in situations when a scope, 
complexity and a level of  influence of breach can in a significant way threaten 
financial security of a state (Sejm.gov.pl, 2016). Consolidation of fiscal administration 
was conducted in two main areas (Explanation…, 2017): 
 
− object consolidation – connecting departments on a central level in the 
Ministry of Finance; 
− subject consolidation – welding on a regional and local level of fiscal 
chambers and offices, fiscal controlling offices and customs chambers and 
offices – into chambers of tax administration and fiscal offices and fiscal 
and customs offices. 
 
 
8 Note: Art.1(2) from 16 November, 2016 on National Revenue Administration (Dz. U. z 2016 
r., pos. 1947). 
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In a place of tax administration (16 tax chambers and tax offices), Customs Office (16 
customs chambers, 45 customs offices with 141 customs agencies), fiscal control (16 
tax controlling offices) KAS was introduced and that is: 16 fiscal administrations 
chambers, 16 fiscal and customs offices (including 45 delegacy and 143 customs 
agencies) and 400 tax offices (The Ministry of Finance, 2017). Schemes of performed 
organizational changes connected with creating new units of KAS are presented 
below.  
 
Efficiency of actions undertaken by operational units KAS, including co-operation 
with other services (Police, Border Patrol, Central Bureau of Investigation, the Internal 
Security Agency), between 01.03.2017 and 30.06.2017, measured by an estimated 
value of revealed and taken excise goods and also drugs, amber, jewellery, 
pharmaceutical goods and other goods, amounted to 90 million PLN. However, 
estimated losses of the State Treasury in virtue of not paid taxes (VAT, excise, duty) 
– in case of introducing unrevealed goods – would reach 249,6 million PLN.  Results 
of comparisons of the outcomes of KAS units in the first 4 months of 2017 are 
presented in Table 2. 
 








Data from 2016 /* 
Data from 01.03.2017 - 
30.06.2017 /** Taken 
goods 




































and duty  
(in thousand 
PLN) 
Total 175 788,6 768 212,3 89 894,7 249 589,7 51,1% 32,5% 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Biuletyn Statystyczny Służy Celnej I-IV quarter of 2016, the 
Ministry of Finance, Warszawa, February 2017 (*) and information from web pages of 16 
chambers of fiscal administration (**). 
 
In a publication in Global Compact Report, in December, about ‘Counteracting grey 
economy in Poland’ (Global Compact Network Poland, 2017) representatives of the 
Ministry of Finance showed a positive aspect of KAS functioning in an area of 
counteracting ‘grey and black economy’. Data from the Ministry of Finance indicated 
that although there was a limitation in a number of controls of entrepreneurs (in 
majority of micro-enterprise) the efficiency increased which had an effect on an 
increase of additional budget incomes. In the first half of 2015 budget incomes 
 
9 Note: Data from 01.03.2017 - 30.06.2017, downloaded in July 2017, so primary evaluation 
of efficiency of regional KAS units could be significantly lowered as in many cases information 
about depletion to a state budget were not yet published. Similarly, date referring to hidden 
values and goods blocked are not full and final because some of actions were not finished then. 
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amounted to 417 million PLN. In the first half of 2017 additional budget incomes 
amounted to 1,020 billion PLN so there was an increase of incomes to a budget of 
over 600 million PLN. At the same time the number of fiscal controls conducted in 
micro-enterprises decreased from 23 439 to 10 699, of almost 54%. Contribution of 
micro-enterprises controls in a decrease of a number of controls in the first half of 
2017 was 79%.   
 
Scheme 10. Additional incomes to the budget as a result of fiscal control activity 
(mln PLN) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Przeciwdziałanie szarej strefie w Polsce (Global Compact 
Network Poland, 2017). 
 
In the report ‘Counteracting grey economy in Poland’ it was stated that coordination 
and centralization of a control are two most important tools that have been 
implemented to counteract with illegal activity. National Revenue Administration 
combined competences that until then had been divided into numerous units. 
Moreover, a system of communication was developed through centralization of 
information eg.in terms of gaining data about potential economic crime. Thus, a level 
of salience of implementations – in the Ministry of Finance opinion – is highly 
evaluated and a level of implementations as maximal, due to the area of impact on 
‘grey and black economy’ (Global Compact Network Poland, 2017). 
 
II. ELECTRONIC TOOLS 
Electronic tools that should support controlling organs and improve effectiveness of 
fighting with grey economy are: 
 
− Standard Audit File-Tax – SAF-T,  
− Central Electronic Register of VAT Invoices (CRF). 
In Poland, in order to complete tasks from area of computerisation of tax 
administration there was a new co-partnership established Aplikacje Krytyczne 
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Spółka z o.o., which was involved in fulfilment of IT projects, including tasks of 
creating ICT system and a Central Electronic Register, development and 
modernisation of existing technologies.  
 
A conception of Standard Audit Tax File was created by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2015) in 2005. One of the main 
aims of OECD was to tighten a tax system in developed countries and perform actions 
that will lead to improving efficiency of tax controls. OECD advised ‘exporting’ data 
in a standardised format, electronic submission of declarations and creating 
documentation that allow for generating appropriate comparisons by system users 
(Mer, 2016). A standardised format of fiscal data in an electronic form has already 
been introduced in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Slovenia, Latvia, Luxemburg, Sweden and Portugal.  
 
▪ Standard Audit File-Tax – SAF-T (Jednolity Plik Kontrolny, JPK) 
Standard Audit File-Tax is a data set that is created in IT systems of an economic unit 
by a direct export of data that includes information about economic operations for a 
given period of time that has a standardised layout and format (scheme XML) that 
allows for easy transformations10. 
 
Standard Audit File-Tax is composed of 7 structures that entail the most important tax 
books and bookkeeping vouchers. Logical structures11 from a Standard Audit File-Tax 
are presented in a Table. 
 
Table 3. Logical structures from a Standard Audit File-Tax12 






Comparison of turnovers and balances, data from 






Initial balance and closing balance form a bank 






Information about goods traffic in a warehouse 




VAT purchase and 
sales records 
One of the most important structures, all 
information about VAT purchase and sales  
 
10Note: https://www.podatki.gov.pl/jednolity-plik-kontrolny/jpk-na-zadanie/. 
11Note: According to a regulation from 24 December, 2007 in a logical structure and 
applications, the way of sending and electronic signature that should be included [Dz. U. 
2007 Nr 246, pos. 1820]. 
12Note: Information regarding changes and structure updates are posted on the internet page 
of the Ministry of Finance https://www.gov.pl/web/kas/struktury-jpk. 
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Tax revenue and 
expense ledger 
(KPiR)  
A structure of created only by an entrepreneur from 





round amount)  
This structure is destined only for enterprises with 
income records (all-round amount tax payers), sums 
of particular incomes or record date 
Source: Self-study on the basis of „Ewidencja dla podatku od towarów i usług JPK_VAT. 
Broszura informacyjna dot. struktury JPK_VAT(2)”(The Ministry of Finance, 2016). 
 
In December 2016 a new application Klient JPK 2.0 was created which main aim is 
to support entrepreneurs in fulfilling an obligation such as submitting documents 
JPK_VAT (that is VAT purchase and sales records) and sending, including other 
documents of JKP types on tax administration request. Creating and sending JPK files 
is possible while using a modern accounting programme and commercial applications 
on-line. A condition is to have an updated function that allow for generating and 
sending files. The application Klient JPK 2.0 allows for a conversion of incoming data 
from a regular file in a .CSV format into .XML format compatible with currently 
existing schemes of JPK_VAT. 
 
An obligation to submit JPK_VAT files by particular groups of entrepreneurs was 
initially dependent on a number of employees (average annual employment), sums of 
balance assets and annual net turnover of an entrepreneur. From January 2018 a 
JPK_VAT file needs to be sent every month by all the registered active taxpayers.  
 
The Ministry of Finance informed that in 2019 there were 23,1 million JPK_VAT files 
submitted, whereas in 2018 there were 20,3 million, this means that an increase was 
of about 13,8%. At the same time in 2019, 8 million 180,9 transactions were analysed 
in JPK_VAT files, whereas in 2018 there were 7 million 508,2 (Jankiewicz, 2020). In 
the first obligatory term of JPK_VAT file submission (that is until 26th February 2018) 
1 508 458 of entrepreneurs submitted JPK_VAT files – which constituted 94,5% of 
all VAT taxpayers.  
 
In total, there were 1 703 271 JPK_VAT files submitted to KAS. It is worth 
mentioning that at the beginning KAS analysts questioned 85 thousand invoices as 
suspicious and so-called blank invoices. They were issued by more than 36 thousand 
entities, which in turn, could cause losses not only in the budget but also of honest 
trading partners. An amount of VAT tax resulting from these invoices was almost 105 
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Scheme 11. JPK_VAT files (2018-2019) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of (Jankiewicz, 2020). 
 
Since the end of 2019 the Ministry of Finance has conducted works on a new 
JPK_VAT file: 
− monthly – JPK_V7M,  
− quarterly– JPK_V7K,  
which includes a declarative and record part. It will be obligatory for all active VAT 
taxpayers to submit the files. The beginning was settled for the 1st of October, 202013. 
A new structure of  JPK_VAT 2020 should make it easier to report regarding VAT 
tax and will contain information about purchase and sale that result from records of 
VAT for a given period of time (record part), items from existing declaration VAT-7 
and VAT-7K (declarative part) and additional data necessary for an analysis of 
calculations correctness. 
 
▪ Central Invoice Record – electronic record of VAT invoices  
Introduction of a central invoice register was proposed by the European Commission 
in 2010. In a ‘Green book about a future of a VAT tax’ it was suggested that invoices 
are sent to a central database that is monitoring calculations of VAT tax (Pietrzak, 
2016; European Commission, 2010). According to the Commission tax authorities 
could gain information faster than it is now and many present obligations regarding a 
VAT tax could be eliminated. This system would be more efficient and less 
uncomfortable if in all transactions electronic invoices are used (European 
Commission, 2010). Central Invoice Record is supposed to be a nationwide repository 
of data where all issued invoices will be gathered. Documents will be archaised and 
also analysed in a frame of controlling procedures (Infor.pl, 2016; European 
Commission, 2010).  An introduction of such a tool will definitely improve controlling 
procedures on clerks’ side, which in turn, could increase a number of controls. All 
irregularities marked in the system can be corrected by taxpayers without 
 
13 Note: The term decided on the basis of  art. 58 item 4 of the Act from the 31st  March, 2020 
on changes of the act about special solutions connected with preventing, counteracting and 
fighting with COVID-19, other infectious diseases and critical situations caused by the disease 
and other Acts (Dz. U. z 2020 r., poz.568), and then according to Art. 72 item 2 of the Act from 
the 19th  June, 2020 about surcharges to taxation of bank credits for entrepreneurs due to 





0 5 10 15 20 25
The number of personalised
transactions (mln)





 Anna Ćwiąkała-Małys, Iwona Piotrowska, Małgorzata Durbajło-Mrowiec,  
Paweł Łagowski   
1013  
consequences within 14 days from a date of receiving a note from a governor of a tax 
office. Introducing this record does not burden taxpayer and does not impose new 
duties. The authors, however, believe that there is necessity to prepare a programming 
supported on a European level and to make it available for all member countries. This 
would give a green light for an exchange of information and for a cooperation of 
countries (Infor.pl, 2016; Stankiewicz, 2017; Pokojska, 2020).  
 
III. LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
• Lowering a limit of cash payments 
Values of limits of cash payments that are present in some of European countries 
(according to data at the end of 2015) are presented in Scheme 12. 
 
Scheme 12. Values of limits of cash payments in Europe and in Poland (in PLN) 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of data from http://dyskusja.biz/finanse/w-europie-trwa-wojna-
wojna-z-gotowka-54251. 
 
From 2017 the art. 22 of the Act on Freedom of business activity14 says that: 
’transferring or receiving payments connected with economic activity is performed by 
a payment account of an entrepreneur in every case when: 
− An entity of transaction, that the payment is made by, is another 
entrepreneur and 
− Value of each transaction, regardless the number of payments, exceeds 
15000 PLN, but transactions in other currency are calculated into PLN 
according to an average currency rate stated by the NBP from the last 
working day before transaction’ 
 
The most important benefits, following from lowering a limit of cash transactions and 




14 Note: The SDG Act – the Act on freedom of business activity (consolidated text - Dz.U. 2016 
nr 0 poz. 1829). 
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Table 4. Benefits for the state budget and for entrepreneurs 
Public finances Business 
Transparency of a calculation system between entities from 
the point of view of controlling authorities, including fiscal; 
Keeping higher amounts on accounts – possibility of using 
towards public-legal liabilities; facilitating performance of 
verifying actions in cases of transactions that could indicate 
trials of VAT tax frauds;  
Facilitating verifying actions according to transactions that 
could indicate records of unreal transactions (primarily of a 
cost type) 
Faster and more effective actions of executive authorities; 
More accurate identification of ‘post’ entities that are only 
established to create a bank account in order to extort a VAT 
tax return; 
Limiting grey economy; 
Increasing income to the state budget 
Forcing timeliness of payment for 
liabilities (on the basis of  mutuality); 
Verification of information about 
potential unreliable contractors 
present on the market in terms of 
timeliness and reliability in 
completing liabilities towards 
contractors; 
Limiting a risk connected  with cash 
theft; 
Limiting costs of keeping cash in a 
company; 
Limiting a risk of taking false 
banknotes   
Source: Self-study on the basis of (Ćwiąkała-Małys, Piotrowska, 2017). 
 
Performing transactions using bank accounts is another improvement in fighting with 
extortions. The Ministry of Finance is planning to lower a level to 8.000 PLN. As a 
consequence, it will bring savings of about 20 billion PLN of costs of production, 
shipment and securing cash. This change should influence tightening a system of cash 
flow and tax collection. Lowering the level should also increase transparency of cash 
flow and as a result should make it easier to fight with grey economy.  
 
▪ Split payment - (mechanizm podzielonej płatności, MPP) 
From the 1st July, 2018 a new mechanism was introduced, a so called split payment 
(MPP). An idea of a split payment mechanism is to make a payment for goods and 
services in a split way for gross value as follows:  
− A payment for a net value of sale is paid by a purchaser to a budget account 
of a supplier, 
− A payment equal to a tax value from goods and services is paid to a special 
bank account  (VAT account) of a supplier/purchaser or to other bank 
account in a building society (SKOK) that is opened due to this business. 
 
In a present legal state split payment can only happen in a form of a transfer between 
banks of contractors with a usage of transfer announcement. Taxpayers can use MPP 
in a voluntary and a selective way which means that not every VAT invoice for goods 
and services should be paid this way. A taxpayer that is a purchaser of goods or 
services decides if split payment will be used (Ćwiąkała-Małys, 2018).  
Using split payment in a transfer for a tax amount from an invoice will exempt a 
purchaser from15: 
a. joint and several liability,  
b. risk of imposing additional tax liability  
- only up to an amount equal to a tax from an invoice.  
 
15 Note: Art. 108c (1), amended VAT Act. 
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The abovementioned exemption from a responsibility will not be valid in a situation 
when a taxpayer knew that an invoice which was paid using split payment option: 
• was issued by a non-existing entity, 
• names activities that were not performed (so called fake or blank 
invoices), 
• shows amounts that are not in accordance with reality, 
• confirms activities contrary to the act or those that are in order to evade 
the law, actions contrary to rules of social coexistence and also activities 
when a declaration of intent was made to another party with its 
acceptance for the sake of appearance. 
 
According to Art. 108d of VAT Act16, when a payment of tax liability is made from 
an additional account, an amount of tax liability can be lowered by an (S) amount 
which can be calculated with a formula: 
  
S = Z x r x n/360 
where: 
S – amount by which a tax liability is decreased due to a tax, 
Z – amount of tax liability resulting from a tax declaration before decreasing this 
liability, 
r – NBP reference rate17 valid two days before making tax payments, 
n – number of days from a day in which an account or SKOK was charged for VAT. 
 
Advantages of Polish split payment:  
− freedom of usage, actions of a legislator until now do not impose any duties 
on entrepreneurs to pay with a usage of split payment for taxpayers and a 
budget; 
− prevent from appropriating VAT tax amount by dishonest taxpayers; 
− limiting a risk of disappearing taxpayers who received VAT tax payment 
from contractors due to the State Treasury; 
− increasing security and constant economic turnover; 
− decreasing a risk of questioning by tax authorities a taxpayer’s right to lower 
tax and joint responsibility and VAT sanctions. 
 
▪ Reverse charge mechanism (MOO)  
A mechanism of reverse charge moves an obligation to settle due VAT tax from a 
taxable transaction (goods and services supply) by a purchaser (that is an entity for 
which a supply of goods and services is performed). An analysis of a stated scale of 
tax frauds in a so called ‘tax carousel’ forced countries of the European Union to 
consider an introduction of periodic reverse charge mechanism in a transaction of 
certain goods. A scheme of tax carousel working (VAT carousel) was based on, the 
 
16 Note: Art. 1 item 4 of Act from the 15th December, 2017 about amendment of Act on tax from 
goods and services and other different Acts (Dz. U. z 2018 r. pos. 62). 
17 Note: Reference rate of (valid since March, 2015) is 1,5%. 
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most often used, so called poles, entities that take part in fake transactions. Basing on 
these transactions tax offenders performed tax frauds. Irregularities in this area were 
at that time indicated by a representative of sensitive businesses.  In a VAT carousel 
it was not only a state budget that lost, increasing ‘a gap of a VAT tax’ but also 
entrepreneurs experienced losses that acted legally.  
 
Reverse charge mechanism is one of a method of counteracting tax fraud such as 
‘disappearing taxpayers’ in areas that are particularly exposed to. From the 1st April, 
2011 the mechanism was implemented for certain goods (a register included scrap and 
non-ferrous metal). Then form the 1st October, 2013 new regulations were introduced 
that extended a list of goods included in a reverse charge mechanism of VAT tax (eg. 
waste and recyclable materials). From the 1st July, 2015 the list was more extended 
and the new one included goods from an electronic category (such as tablets, 
notebooks, laptops, mobile phone, play stations), goods form a category of gold, rough 
non-ferrous metals (aluminum, lead, zinc, tin, nickel) and other goods form a steel 
category. 
 
Actions that were taken were supposed to limit a scale of irregularities and 
malpractices but the analyses that were conducted of results of such solutions showed 
that a reverse charge mechanism was not fully effective. A gap of a VAT tax was not 
limited, and it even increased because tax fiddlers changed a group of goods that were 
a subject of VAT tax carousel every time.  
 
▪ Joint and several liability (VAT) 
Together with a reverse liability a new  institution of joint and several liability of a 
purchaser was introduced for VAT tax liabilities in case of supply of goods that are 
listed in an appendix 13 of the Act on VAT tax, these are so called sensitive goods. 
This appendix entails: 
− some of steel products (not entailed by reverse exchange),  
− fuel,  
− exploitation materials for printers, 
− some of noble metals and parts of jewellery,  
− digital cameras,  
− stretch foil,  
− hard discs. 
 
A purchaser that is also a VAT taxpayer is jointly liable with a supplier of goods, what 
is mentioned in an appendix 13, of a VAT tax Act for due liabilities in a part of a tax 
proportionately to a supply for a given taxpayer (art. 105a (1)). Tax responsibility of 
a purchaser can be used in terms of transactions that comply with the two 
characteristics: 
− net value of goods purchased from one taxpayer that supply in a particular 
month and the value of transaction cannot exceed 50 000 PLN, 
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− at a time of supplying goods a purchaser knew or had reasons to suppose 
that the whole amount of tax for the supply of goods or a part of it will not 
be paid to an account of a revenue office. 
 
▪ Blocking bank accounts (STIR) 
From the 13th January, 2018 an new Act from the 24th November, 2017 on changes in 
counteracting a usage of financial sector to frauds, a so called STIR Act was 
introduced. For many years taxpayers had been demanding from the Ministry of 
Finance introduction of new instruments that would have allowed them to check their 
contractors. Due to this Act a new ICT system of accounting chamber STIR was 
introduced. The most important aim of this STIR Act was to limit a gap in a VAT 
value, caused by tax frauds, most often caused by organised criminal groups. It 
happens through generating false transactions, so called carousel transactions while 
transferring money on bank accounts. An actual aim of these transactions is to extort 
tax in a form of undue VAT tax return which causes losses to the State Treasury. 
System STIR eliminates from economic turnover companies that simulate business 
activity that deceive legally operating entrepreneurs and as a result improves security 
of VAT taxpayers in economic turnover. Using new IT solutions enables to easily 
download data for financial analyses that allow for identification of transactions 
characteristic for tax frauds.  
 
Bank accounts of entrepreneurs that are suspected of frauds may be blocked for 72 
hours18, that should enable eg.: 
− An analysis of observed actions that have the appearance of tax frauds; 
− Identification of entities involved in this practice, including gathering 
information on fulfilling tax liabilities and about assets they have; 
− description of financial transfers between bank accounts that fiddlers use; 
− an analysis of typology of frauds in a particular case; 
− preparing possible decision on prolonging a blockage (even up to 3 months); 
− coordinating actions with other authorities19. 
 
Monitoring STIR entails more than 5,6 million accounts of so-called qualified entities 
which means different account than those of natural persons, for private transfers. In 
2018 (since the 30th April so from first possible moment of using a blockage till the 
31st December) there were 41 accounts and 23 entities blocked20.  
 
18Note: Here we do not include Saturdays, Sundays and holidays that are days stated as days 
off. 
19Note: Art. 119 zw § 1 Ordynacji podatkowej (Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 900). 
20Note: According to  https://www.prawo.pl/podatki/stir-blokowanie-rachunkow-bankowych-
bedzie-w-ordynacji,370224.html: a number of blockages is 33 bank accounts that belonged 
to 23 entities qualified and a total value of blockages was 10,47 mln PLN. However, 
according to the Ministry of Finance in 2018 there were blocked bank accounts of 39 entities 
for an amount of 10,2 mln PLN., https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/uszczelnienie-systemu-
podatkowego. 
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However, during a period of nine months of 2019 a head of KAS blocked 359 accounts 
for 40 million PLN suspecting tax frauds of an amount of 492 million PLN (Zalewski, 
2019). In 2019, 537 bank accounts were blocked belonging to 113 entities for an 
amount of 67,2 million PLN (Witwicka, 2020). This change is a vital support for 
taxpayers in fulfilling tax liabilities. 
 
Table 5. Information resources of STIR  
Specification IV - XII 2018 I - XII 2019 
Increase (+) / 
Decrease (-) 
Number of banks and SKOK facilitating a system (pc.) 619 614 -5 
Number of qualifying entities reported to STIR (mln) 3,44 3,95 0,51 
Number of people connected with qualifying entities 
(mln) 
4,61 5,47 0,86 
Number of budget accounts reported to STIR (mln) 11,56 15,74 4,18 
Number of transactions reported to the system(mln) 8 525,07 11 537,64 3 012,57 
Number of entities classified to groups of high risk of 
using financial sector to tax frauds (thousand) 
29 58 29 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Sprawozdania za 2018 r. i 2019 rok w zakresie 
przeciwdziałania wykorzystywaniu działalności banków i spółdzielczych kas oszczędnościowo-
kredytowych do celów mających związek z wyłudzeniami skarbowymi (Gov.pl, 2019-2020).  
 
Scheme 13. Blockages of funds by the Head of KAS in 2018 - 2019 
 
Source: Self-study on the basis of Sprawozdania za 2018 r. i 2019 rok w zakresie 
przeciwdziałania wykorzystywaniu działalności banków i spółdzielczych kas oszczędnościowo-
kredytowych do celów mających związek z wyłudzeniami skarbowymi (Gov.pl, 2019-2020). 
 
In total, from the 30th  April, 2018 till the 23rd January, 2020 National Revenue 
Administration blocked 648 of bank accounts where they secured 86 million PLN due 
to suspicion of tax frauds for 771 million PLN. STIR allowed fiscal controlling 
authorities to break tax carousels that were found in food, construction, motorization 
and textile industry (Szulc, 2020). 
 
▪ ‘A white list’ of taxpayers 
From the 1st September, 2019 the Ministry of Finance has been publishing, on the 
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out and re-registered to a list of VAT taxpayers21. An entity, that is obliged to prepare 
such register, its ever day update, is a Head of National Revenue Administration22. 
 
A register includes among others23: 
− A name of a company or a name and surname of an entrepreneur ; 
− tax identification number, if it was issued (NIP); 
− identification number REGON, if it was issued; 
− a number in the National Court Registry, if it was issued;  
− an address of residence – in case of an entity that is not a natural person; 
− names and surnames of people from an authority eligible to represent an 
entity and their tax identification numbers; 
− names and surnames of confidential clerks and their tax identification 
numbers;  
− a name and a surname of a company (name) of co-partner and his tax 
identification number. 
 
 ‘White list’ allows to: 
• check if a given contractor is an active VAT taxpayer, 
• find out about legal act according to which a contractor was refused to be 
registered or was crossed out from a register or was re-registered as a VAT 
taxpayer,  
• check a bank account of a contractor indicated to account for a given 
economic transaction. 
 
Checking information about a status of a taxpayers and a bank account can be made 
on a date of checking or any other date in the past, however not earlier than 5 years 
before a year in which a checkout was done. 
 
The authors of publication perceive that although a wide spectrum of information, 
there is one disadvantage of a subjective list such as a lack of information regarding 
bank accounts of entities that were refused to register as VAT taxpayers or were 
crossed out from list of tax payers. Additionally, a list does not include information 
(also about bank accounts) referring to entities that are waiting for a registration as 
VAT taxpayers or are not obliged to be VAT taxpayers. 
 
From the 1st January, 2020; when transferring money, more than 15000 PLN to a 
contractor for an account different than mentioned on the list: 
 
21Note: This list is available in a Bulletin for Public Information on the internet page of 
offices responsible for public finances –according to Art. 96b on goods and services 
(https://www.podatki.gov.pl/wykaz-podatnikow-vat-wyszukiwarka). 
22Thus, colloquial name: A list of the Head of KAS or ‘white list’. 
23Source: https://www.biznes.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/biala-lista-podatnikow-vat-nowe-
narzedzie-do-sprawdzania-kontrahentow. 
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• it will not be possible to include these costs (or a part of them) in taxable costs  
if they were paid to a different account than those included in the register, 
• there will be a risk of joint responsibility for due liabilities if a contractor will 




According to the authors of this article: 
• presented results of estimating grey economy in Poland show that it is 
advisable to create such methodology of its measurement that will comply 
with conditions of comparability with methods around the world,  
• presented organisational-legal solutions presented separately and IT tools 
may not bring expected results. There are more chances to improve a 
support with the usage of modern IT solutions not only within a country but 
also around the world,  
• properly used tools and legal measures are supposed to protect these 
entrepreneurs that act legally against unconscious participation in so called 
VAT carousel or joint and several liability. Additionally, they should 
improve and ease a system of fiscal calculations.  
 
All changes in limiting grey economy will understood and accepted when 
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